This paper proposes the concept of digital mirroring to explore and contextualise post-Arab Spring digital feminism in the Levant within a critical discourse framework. Digital mirroring illustrates the way in which contemporary Arab feminist groups articulate their digital presence orienting toward the vertical dimension of their sociopolitical contexts and toward the horizontal dimension characterised by the digital practices of other feminist movements in the region. We observed this phenomenon through the analysis of a multimodal corpus of Facebook and Instagram posts (...) published by thirty-two institutionalised and non-institutionalised feminist groups in Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, and Syria between 2011 and 2019. The analysis of the linguistic and the visual strategies of MENA feminist groups is grounded in contemporary sociolinguistic studies on Arabic diglossia and multimodality. Findings reveal the complex interplay of digital self-representation, local resistance, and transregional networking of Levantine women. We argue that a simultaneous analysis of the vertical and the horizontal contextual dimensions of digital mirroring is necessary to comprehend social media discursive strategies and their transregional breadth as a central component of contemporary Arab feminism and emancipatory discourses at large. (shrink)

It is customary in current philosophy of time to distinguish between an A- (or tensed) and a B- (or tenseless) theory of time. It is also customary to distinguish between an old B-theory of time, and a new B-theory of time. We may say that the former holds both semantic atensionalism and ontological atensionalism, whereas the latter gives up semantic atensionalism and retains ontological atensionalism. It is typically assumed that the B-theorists have been induced by advances in the philosophy of (...) language and related A-theorists’ criticisms to acknowledge that semantic atensionalism can hardly stand, but have also maintained that what is essential for the B-theory is ontological atensionalism, which can be independently defended. Here it is argued that the B-theorists have been too quick in abandoning semantic atensionalism: they can still cling to it. (shrink)

This book is the first translation into the English language of a comprehensive study of opera and its constituent parts by an accomplished writer of the Eighteenth Century. Francesco Algarotti was concerned with developing opera as drama and a move away from the elaborate formality of the Baroque to a more naturalistic style. The Essay in its original Italian had considerable influence on the reform opera of Christoph Willibald Gluck.

Bu araştırma, İbn Sînâcı ve İbn Sînâ-sonrası temsilciliğe ve kavramcılığa yönelik Fahreddin er-Râzî’nin tutumunun g mini, onu bu gibi öğretilere karşı giderek daha çok şüpheye düşüren nedenleri irdelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. İbn Sînâ’nın temsilciliğine göre bilgiye, zorunlu olarak, bilgi nesnelerinin mahiyetleriyle özdeş olan zihnî suretler aracılık eder. İbn Sînâ-sonrası bazı düşünürler, zihnî suretleri mahiyetleri açısından nesnelerden farklı olarak, onların yalnızca birer imgeleri olarak dikkate alıp bu açıklamayı yeniden biçimlendirirler. Râzî her iki yaklaşımı da eleştirir. Varlığın eş sesli olmayışına dayanarak İbn Sînâcı temsilciliğin (...) iki kurucu öncülünü (zihnî varlığın ayrılığını ve saf mahiyetin varoluşsal farksızlığını) reddettiği gibi, İbn Sînâ’nın teorisinin sonuçlarından birine (mahiyetlerin zihin-dışı lazımlarını bilmenin imkânsızlığına) dayanarak temsilciliğin kendisini de reddeder. Râzî başlı başına temsilciliğe karşı olarak, temsilciliğin öncüllerinden birinin (bilgi bilende yerleşik olan, izafî-olmayan belirli bir araz gerektirir) yeterince yeterince gerekçelendirilmediğini iddia eder ve ayrıca bilginin tamamen izafet olduğuna ilişkin kendi teorisine dayanarak burhanî açıdan yanlış olduğunu ileri sürer. İbn Sînâ’nın kavramcılığı şeylerin üç sınıfıyla ilgilidir; var olmayan bilgi nesneleri, basit mahiyetlerin tanımsal parçaları ve ikincil akledilirler (mantıksal nitelikler). İbn Sînâ-sonrası kavramcılar Şeyh’i aşarak, üçüncü sınıfı sadece mantıksal nitelikleri değil varlık, birlik, şeylik, kipler ve genel olarak izafetler gibi nitelikleri de içerecek şekilde genişletir. Râzî’nin var olmayan bilgi nesneleri konusunda kavramcılığa yönelik saldırısı, hem varlığın kaplam bakımından sınırsız olduğu şeklindeki genel öncülü hem de hayal nesnelerinin zihin-dışında var olmayan mahiyetlere sahip olduğu şeklindeki özel öncülü eleştirir. Râzî ayrıca (mütekabiliyet argümanı, zihnin ortadan kaldırılması argümanı gibi) genel olarak kavramcılığa karşı olan argümanlar da geliştirir. (shrink)

This article presents results from a multidisciplinary research project on the integration and transfer of language knowledge into robots as an empirical paradigm for the study of language development in both humans and humanoid robots. Within the framework of human linguistic and cognitive development, we focus on how three central types of learning interact and co-develop: individual learning about one's own embodiment and the environment, social learning (learning from others), and learning of linguistic capability. Our primary concern is how these (...) capabilities can scaffold each other's development in a continuous feedback cycle as their interactions yield increasingly sophisticated competencies in the agent's capacity to interact with others and manipulate its world. Experimental results are summarized in relation to milestones in human linguistic and cognitive development and show that the mutual scaffolding of social learning, individual learning, and linguistic capabilities creates the context, conditions, and requisites for learning in each domain. Challenges and insights identified as a result of this research program are discussed with regard to possible and actual contributions to cognitive science and language ontogeny. In conclusion, directions for future work are suggested that continue to develop this approach toward an integrated framework for understanding these mutually scaffolding processes as a basis for language development in humans and robots. (shrink)

In this article I examine the possibility of identifying an ‘ontology’ within the context of Ancient Greek thought. Usually considered as a discipline introduced only in the Early-Modern philosophy, I seek here to demonstrate that the reflection on being conducted by Parmenides is already based on some of the theoretical assumptions characteristic of the ontology of the moderns, namely first and foremost the thesis of the univocity of being and the universality of the science concerning it, to which is added (...) the assumption of its full thinkability, whereby being ends up coinciding with what can actually and fully be thought. (shrink)

We investigate the class of strongly distributive pregroups, a common abstraction of MV-algebras and Abelian l-groups which was introduced by E.Casari. The main result of the paper is a representation theorem which yields both Chang's representation of MV-algebras and Clifford's representation of Abelian l-groups as immediate corollaries.

Francesco Fronterotta | : La psychologie platonicienne de la République semble être affectée par une contradiction en relation avec la thèse de la tripartition de l’âme. Celle-ci est esquissée dans le livre IV et est toujours présente dans les livres VIII et IX ; Socrate semble pourtant l’abandonner lorsque, dans le livre X, il introduit la thèse selon laquelle l’âme est une réalité double, et peu après parvient, dans la suite du livre X, à démontrer son immortalité, en la (...) décrivant comme une réalité simple, unique et unitaire. J’essaierai de montrer que ces changements de perspective dépendent du point de vue assumé par Platon dans son traitement de la nature et de la fonction de l’âme, dans les contextes que j’appellerai « génétiques », c’est-à-dire là où l’analyse touche à la question du statut ontologique de l’âme, et dans les contextes que j’appellerai « opérationnels », c’est-à-dire lorsque ce sont les fonctions, les compétences et les motivations de l’âme dans sa direction du corps qui font l’objet de l’analyse. | : There is a seeming contradiction in the Republic in Plato’s psychology of the tripartite soul, which is dealt with in Book IV and which recurs in Books VIII and IX. Socrates seems to retract this view when in Book X he introduces the theory that the soul is actually dual, and then later in the same Book demonstrates its immortality, presenting it in this case as something simple, single and unitary. I shall try to show how this see-sawing depends on the different point of view that Plato takes when he deals with the nature and the function of the soul, respectively in the “genetic” contexts, where his examination touches directly on the question of the soul’s ontological status, and the “operative” contexts, when what is being analysed are the functions, scope and motivations of the soul that intervene in its action of controlling the body. (shrink)

Dans le Parménide de Platon (135 c8 - d5), Parménide propose à Socrate un exercise dialectique, préliminaire à la recherche de la vérité, qui consiste essentiellement dans la vérification de la cohérence logique des conséquences déduites d'une certaine hypothèse et, ensuite, du renversement de l'hypothèse initiale, par rapport à l'objet de l'hypothèse et par rapport à son opposé. Dans un passage très bref (137 b 1-4), Parménide déclare que son examen sera consacré à l' « un lui-même » et qu'il (...) se déroulera à partir de sa propre thèse philosophique. Mais quel est l'objet de l'hypothèse de Parménide? L' « un lui-même », comme le texte semble l'indiquer, ou alors le principe de l' « unité du tout », qui constitue la thèse fondamentale défendue par l'Éléate dans le dialogue? Le but de cet article est justement d'éclairer le contenu de l'hypothèse de Parménide. In Plato's Parmenides (135 c8 - d5), Parmenides suggests Socrates to practice a dialectical exercise before the search for truth: this exercise consists in verifying the logical consistence of the consequences of a certain hypothesis and of its reversal, with respect to the object of the hypothesis and to its opposite. In a very short passage (137 b1-4), Parmenides states that his analysis will be dedicated to the « One itself » and that it will start from his philosophical thesis. But what's the object of Parmenides' hypothesis? The « One itself », as the text seems to mean, or the principle of the « Unity of the All », which is Parmenides' fundamental thesis in the dialogue named after him? This paper intends to clarify the content of Parmenides' hypothesis. (shrink)

Nietzsche’s life and thinking have been deeply influenced by the experience of illness and the related struggle to health, in a way that goes far beyond the very well-known episode of his mental breakdown. In the first part of this paper the history of the reception of the topic is reconsidered, focusing on the initial, “moral” interpretation of health and illness in Nietzsche, on the later stances of Thomas Mann and Georges Canguilhelm, the former offering a psychological perspective, the latter (...) a physiological one, and ending with an overview of newer studies on the question. The second part deals with Nietzsche’s understanding of human finitude, suffering and death, and contrasts it with post-humanist and trans-humanist assumptions. Health in Nietzsche is not standardized; it’s a result of self-cultivation, that is, of the full development of one’s potenBal. In the end an idea of health as a dynamic balance is developed, that also draws oh Gadamer’s reflections on the art of medicine and on the practical dimension of human experience. (shrink)